Almost 23,000 people – the vast majority of them Palestinian – have been killed since Hamas launched an attack on Israel in the south of Israel on October 7th, in unprecedented attacks.
As the end of 2023 approaches, Israel’s offensive shows no signs of stopping and the death toll on both sides will rise as the fighting continues.
Political attempts at peace have failed.
Israel has stated from the beginning that its goal is to eliminate Hamas’ military and government capabilities. To this end, the aerial bombardment and ground invasion of the Gaza Strip has continued almost without interruption since October 7.
Although he admits that Israel has so far failed in this mission, he says that it is only a matter of time before this goal is achieved. But does the situation on the ground support this claim?
The answer is a cautious no.
A detailed and impartial analysis of various aspects of its performance concludes that Hamas has so far had more successes than failures for the following reasons.
Hamas continues to exist
The organization is still very much alive. Politically, it is still recognized – de facto if not de jure – as the only entity that exercises control over what remains of the severely damaged civilian structures in the Gaza Strip.
It is part of indirect negotiations that have resulted in a one-week pause in the attack on Gaza and a limited exchange of Israeli and Palestinian captives and hostages. As long as it retains its remaining hostages, Hamas will remain the indispensable “other side” without which they will be unable to free those captives.
Israel has repeatedly stated that there is “no place” for Hamas in Gaza’s post-war civilian structures, but has never produced the appearance of a concrete alternative plan.
There have been many vague and vague suggestions that Gaza’s future would be better without Hamas, but no one has offered any coherent suggestions on how to get rid of Hamas and what to replace it with.
The US, some Arab states and various international organizations have suggested that post-war Gaza should be run by Fatah or a pan-Arab force, but have not presented any concrete plans to achieve this. For now, this remains enthusiastic. For the foreseeable future, therefore, Hamas is here to stay.
Hamas remains an effective military force Hamas’ military wing, the Qassam Brigades, has never publicly disclosed information about its structure, organization or numbers.
Some experts, using open sources and leaked intelligence from Israeli, US, Arab and Russian sources, estimate the strength of the Qassam Brigades to be between 30,000 and 45,000 fighters.
Even the most cautious analysts believe that before the war the force could have had at least 18,000 well-trained, disciplined and ideologically motivated front-line soldiers in its ranks, anything above that number being secondary.
Various Israeli claims of 10,000 Hamas fighters being killed are exaggerated.
The Qassam brigades have suffered heavy losses, but most of its battalions remain effective fighting units. The Institute for the Study of War, an influential and well-informed US think tank, estimated on October 7 that only three of the 26 to 30 combat battalions – each with 400 to 1,000 men – have been rendered inoperable. or, in civilian parlance, destroy it.
Of the rest, four or five have been “degraded”, that is, their strength is reduced but they continue to fight, either alone or joining other units.
On the one hand, the military wing of Hamas has shown exceptional efficiency: all units whose commanders have been killed have nevertheless continued to fight under their replacements.
Relying on its excellent field intelligence, Israel has managed to kill at least five battalion commanders in targeted airstrikes, and at least six others have been killed in battle, including the commander of the Northern Brigade. However, none of these units were “headless” and collapsed, confirming Hamas’ clear ability to plan and train competent deputies.
Israel has been destroying or blocking tunnel entrances wherever it can find them, but there are clear signs that Hamas maintains enough underground facilities to move forces between the front lines and often to successfully shift and surprise the enemy.
Hamas is supported by other armed factions
Reports from Gaza sometimes indicate that Hamas’ armed wing, the Qassam Brigades, is doing all the fighting. In fact, there are no less than 12 different armed groups, affiliated with different political and ideological blocs. The second best known is the Islamic Jihad, but among others, there are the Popular Resistance Committee and two Fronts for the Liberation of Palestine of almost the same name – one calling itself “popular” and the other “democratic”.
Probably not associated with Hamas is the Al-Aqsa Martyr Brigades, the armed wing of its rival, Fatah. Political differences aside, however, it fights in coordination with the Qassam Brigades and largely under overall command.
Bringing all these groups under the umbrella of Hamas is a pragmatic solution born out of necessity, but it seems to be working to the satisfaction of all involved, with no apparent tensions or cracks so far.
There have been no credible claims of any of these smaller units disbanding, deserting or collaborating with the enemy under pressure from the Israeli armed forces. Moreover, it cannot be ruled out that some of them may, at least temporarily, join the Qassam Brigades.
The continuous coexistence of these armed factions while facing the same threat is undoubtedly a success for Hamas.
Hamas has gained popularity in the West Bank
Against the prevailing Israeli and Western image of Hamas as unacceptable terrorists and murderers of innocent civilians – a view that has been particularly strengthened since the indiscriminate massacre was reported on October 7 – many Palestinians see it in a different light.
Those who see themselves as victims of Israeli oppression, inequality, lawlessness and discrimination often idolize Hamas as the fearless defender of the Palestinians, and often as the only group to do so. Many young people born since the Oslo Accords of the 1990s, which sought to provide a two-state solution, recognize that they are frustrated by the inability of the Palestinian Authority to ensure what was agreed, promised and signed in those agreements.
This sense of frustration has become particularly strong in the Fatah-ruled West Bank, which many young people see as ineffective, corrupt, incapable and disinterested in working for the Palestinian cause.
The escalation of attacks by illegal Israeli settlers, who continue to harass, rob and inflict violence on Palestinians in the West Bank with impunity, has further alienated Palestinians.
Many Palestinians in the West Bank reacted to the Gaza war by openly displaying Hamas flags, often alongside those of Fatah. Young Palestinians living in the walled and divided West Bank have long resented being passive underdogs, always on the receiving end of this kind of treatment.
Many have now placed their hopes and hopes on those who stood up, fought and struck Israel hard even though Israel is much stronger.
Although this view defies logic and may seem surprising to outsiders, there is no doubt that it is real.
Even if Israel succeeds in its goal of “ending” Hamas – a completely unrealistic prospect – many Palestinians would remember Hamas as the only group that refuses to sit back passively and take the brunt of Israel’s blows.
Despite the heavy casualties it has taken and the image it has gained in the West, Hamas probably has more reason to be satisfied than to worry.
